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by Meaza Zerihun Demissie 
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The Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region has become a classic case of the resource-
curse phenomenon characterized by the abundance of natural resources, low economic 
development, and misuse of natural resources. Economic-development experts debate 
ways to overcome or avoid the resource curse to advance SSA countries into developed 
countries. Only one natural resource-rich country in the region, Botswana, has succeeded 
in becoming an upper middle-income country using its natural resources, making the 
possibility of replication of this achievement difficult. The literature aligns in the belief 
that the economic and political well-being of resource-rich nations depends highly on the 
actors involved. National and international policies and regulations must overcome the 
resource curse. However, the literature falls short of clarifying the types of governance 
traits and international interventions required to overcome this phenomenon. The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)—a global initiative established in 
2002 that seeks to improve the management of natural-resource wealth in implementing 
countries through increased transparency—is one of the international initiatives currently 
being implemented in many Sub-Saharan resource-rich countries. This study examines 
EITI to explore its influence on achieving resource transparency and economic growth. 
The study finds that EITI, although often acknowledged as one of the best solutions for 
resource-rich countries around the world, falls short of increasing the economic growth of 
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participating countries. The study also finds that transparency without other government 
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The natural resource curse is a phenomenon where natural resource endowed 
countries experience worse economic and political outcomes than countries with no 
natural resource endowment (Siegle 2008). This study only addresses hydrocarbons, 
metals, minerals, and oil.1 Dutch Disease is an economic phenomenon that occurred in 
The Netherlands in the 1960s. Following a sizable natural-gas discovery in The 
Netherlands, the value of Dutch currency increased, rendering exports from other sectors 
uncompetitive. As a result, the real exchange rate appreciated as resource revenues 
entered the economy. Exchange rates’ consistent relationship with oil and gas revenues 
make it difficult for countries discovering such resources to accumulate the foreign 
currency required for trade (Korhonen and Juurikkala 2007). The case of the Netherlands 
is not unique, as many countries with large endowments, on average, perform worse than 
those that are less significantly endowed (Auty 2001). Some countries, however, have 
performed much better than others and have even succeeded in attaining economic 
growth and development. In contrast to countries performing poorly, like Nigeria and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, counter examples exist, like Botswana, Norway, and 
Malaysia. Ideally, resources should be a source of wealth and development, and resource 
revenues can be a significant source for escaping the development trap and attaining the 
major thrust needed for economic growth and development (Collier 2007). Resource-rich 
                                                 




countries like Malaysia, Botswana, Indonesia, and Thailand have proven that natural 
resource-rich countries can sustain economic growth and attain economic development, 
and that their abundance of natural resources does not necessarily preclude development. 
The success of these countries shows that reversing or preventing the resource curse is 
possible. 
Rodrik (1999) and Pritchett (2000) state that institutional quality is important for 
long-term economic growth. Therefore, it is not surprising that the majority of people 
who live in resource-rich countries possess poor institutional quality. Instead, the 
governments of these countries are often riddled with corruption, thereby creating acute 
inequality for their citizens. Moreover, successful resource-rich countries share common 
traits related to institutions for economic growth and development. Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003) argue that it is not the existence of natural resources per se that is 
causing resource-abundant countries to fail; instead, it is the quality of the institutions and 
public policies that result in low economic development. Controlling for institutions, 
these authors find that natural resources are not significantly related to economic growth. 
Institutions are key to reversing the resource curse and may be part of the solution for the 
ills of resource-rich African countries. The literature on the resource curse is vast, 
suggesting many ways to overcome it. Yet, overall, few studies analyze countries that 
overcame the resource curse. 
The resource curse is a complicated phenomenon that results from a variety of 
reasons, including the Dutch disease, rent seeking, crowding out of human capital, and 
crowding out of social capital (Auty 2001). Here I highlight three reasons for poor 
performance of resource-rich countries, interlaced with the aforementioned poor 
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institutional quality. First, resource revenue tends to corrupt government officials, as it 
may be easier for the owners of capital to bribe officials than to invest in industries and 
projects affecting long-term development (Barbier 2005). This is particularly true for oil-
rich countries including Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and Venezuela, and diamond-rich 
countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2005). In 
these countries, the rent-seeking behaviors of officials, backed by foreign extractive 
firms, have lowered the benefits of resource revenues. 
Second, the prices of natural resources are volatile, making repayment of loans 
difficult. As prices of natural resources (not only oil, but also minerals, grain, and coffee) 
are volatile, countries that specialize in extractive industries and commodities will have a 
disadvantage in their terms of trade. According to Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2009) 
“volatility in natural resource revenues, induced by volatility in primary commodity 
prices, curbs growth in economies with badly functioning financial systems” (3).  
Third, abundant natural resources crowd out other economic sectors, including 
human and social capital. Crowding out refers to a transfer of talent and innovation away 
from other export-based sectors of the economy. Of the main types of capital (economic, 
social, and natural), a negative link exists between natural-resource capital and human-
capital investment (Birdsall, Pinckney, and Sabot 2000). Natural resources crowd out 
human resources by affecting the allocation of education resources. In doing this, 
resource-rich countries tend to invest insufficiently in education. All of these cause a 
resource curse, suggesting a strong case for greater domestic policy change and creation 




While the resource curse seems to impact many countries, they are accompanied 
by proposed solutions to reverse this phenomenon. For example, Barbier (2005) 
recommends diversifying economies and avoiding currency appreciation to reverse or 
slow the resource curse. The second solution, avoiding currency appreciation, allows 
countries to export natural resources to the global market at a low price. First, resource-
rich countries should not initially set the export value of their natural resources at a 
higher cost value because a rapid influx of foreign currency causes a devaluing of local 
currency. Moreover, when the currency of a given country rises significantly, the rise 
impacts the country’s international economic activity. The influx of foreign currency 
causes appreciation in the value of the domestic currency. Yet, setting the export value at 
lower levels should be monitored closely because the set lower price value is not a viable 
long-term solution. 
Additionally, one common recommendation for resource-rich countries to achieve 
economic growth is to adopt transparency-related policies. An international initiative 
with a central focus to reinforce transparency is the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI). In 2003, EITI was created to fill the gap in international law to enforce 
transparency in extractive industries of resource-abundant countries. This initiative 
requires participating countries to publish all data on revenues from mining and oil 
operations. EITI is an international voluntary regulatory initiative supported by 
international organizations including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and the European Investment Bank. As of August 
2014, twenty-one African countries have signaled their intent to implement the EITI to 
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increase transparency. The plans for this initiative include reversing the current misuse of 
natural-resource revenues (World Bank and Global Witness 2008). However, the 
effectiveness of the EITI has not yet been tested. 
Purpose of the Study 
This study investigates ways to overcome the resource curse, particularly the role 
of transparency in the economic growth of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries. The 
literature on economic growth frequently does not consider the impact of government 
transparency and international transparency enforcement. This study examines the 
relationship between economic growth and transparency for resource-rich SSA countries. 
In the study, I will emphasize the effect the EITI initiative may have on the growth path 
of these countries. Thus, the study seeks to answer the following questions: 
1. Does transparency affect the economic success of resource-rich SSA 
countries? 
2. Is there a difference between the economic performance of resource-rich SSA 
countries that participate in EITI and those not participating in EITI? 
To investigate these research questions, I put forward the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 
H0: There is no relationship between transparency and economic growth in 
resource-rich SSA countries. 
H1: There is a direct relationship between transparency and economic growth in 




H0: There is no difference in economic growth between EITI countries and non-
EITI participants. 
H1: There is a direct relationship between economic growth and EITI 
participation. 
Relevance of the Study 
Malawi’s President Bingu Wa Mutharika is known for his statement that “Africa 
is not a poor continent; but the people of Africa are poor” (Mutharika 2010, 3), summing 
the core relevance of this study. Africans who live in resource-rich countries often 
wonder why their lives do not improve while their countries export thousands of barrels 
of oil and tons of minerals per day, generating large resource revenues. Natural resources 
are owned by the people and should benefit the people. The United Nations’ Declaration 
affirms this: “The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their 
natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national 
development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned” (General 
Assembly Resolution 1962, 2). 
This study is significant for many reasons. First, compared to other regions, 
Africa has a smaller population benefiting from these resources (Gelb and Grasmann 
2008). Further, Ross (2001) highlights that resource-rich countries, particularly those 
dependent on exporting mineral resources, have a lower Human Development Index 
when compared to countries with more limited resources. The stakes of reversing the 
resource curse are much higher in SSA than in other regions, as the region is blessed with 
extensive untapped natural resources, but ravaged by abject poverty, requiring a close 
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study of the relationship between natural resources, economic growth, and development. 
Extractive companies are competing to meet the growing demand for natural resources. 
Unless action is taken to reverse the current low economic growth and development in 
the region, the notion of a natural-resource curse is going to dominate the development 
debate in SSA. 
Moreover, lack of transparency and sound governance has fueled misuse of funds 
in many countries. For example, Werner (2009) shows that “at least one in every eight 
barrels of oil currently entering the United States has been stolen from its country of 
origin” (1). Similarly, the governments of two of the largest oil-producing countries in 
Africa—Angola and Nigeria—are corrupt. The Transparency International (TI)’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks Nigeria and Angola 144 and 153 of 177 
countries in 2013 (TI 2013). In the case of Angola, McMillan (2005) estimates that as 
much as $1 billion of oil revenue was lost every year in the early 2000s. In most cases, a 
dominant elite group benefits from the country’s natural resources at the expense of the 
public. 
This study makes two major contributions. The first is its exploratory theoretical 
and empirical review of transparency to identify its role in the resource-curse thesis and 
economic growth. The second is a measure of EITI and its impact on economic growth. 
This study is structured as follows: Chapter II provides the theoretical framework for the 
study. Chapter III provides an overview of the relevant literature. Chapter IV sets forth 
the research questions, hypotheses, methodological approach, and statistical analyses 
used in this study. Chapter V details the results of the statistical analyses. Chapter VI 






Institutions have proven to be vital for economic growth; indeed, North (2005) 
notes how a particular country’s political, legal, economic, and social institutions impact 
its economic growth rate. Rodrik (1999) and Pritchett (2000) also note how institutional 
quality provides for long-term economic growth of countries. For natural resources and 
economic growth, institutional theorists argue that weak governments and corruption are 
major factors for what is known as the natural resource curse phenomenon (Neumayer 
and Dietz 2005). In part, this study posits that low economic growth in resource-rich SSA 
countries can be explained in the framework of institutional theory. 
Institutions “are made up of formal constraints (such as rules, laws, routines and 
constitutions), and informal constraints (such as norms of behavior, conventions, self-
imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics” (North 1994, 360). 
Institutional theory points out that countries adopt and execute formal and informal 
constraints over time. This study uses the tenets of institutional theory to identify how a 
well-established government, as well as the rules and regulations used by governments, 
can provide formal constraints. Countries increasingly need informal constraints, such as 
good social behavior, to build good institutions. In a recent analysis, North further argues, 
“institutional change can result from change in the formal rules, informal, norms or the 
enforcement of either of these” (North 2005, 6). Thus, the combination of the formal and 
informal cultural, political, and economic set up of a given country affects how policies 
are designed and implemented. 
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Institutional theory falls under the rubric of new institutional economics, a field 
that incorporates the theory of institutions into economics. Institutional economics is an 
extension of neoclassical theory, which results from cooperation between economists and 
political scientists studying the role of institutions in economic growth. Neoclassical 
theory encompasses topics related to “property rights analysis, the economic analysis of 
the law, public choice theory, constitutional economics, the theory of collective action, 
transaction cost economics, the principal-agent approach, the theory of relational 
contracts, and comparative economic systems” (Richter 2005, 22) that can typically be 
categorized as either politics or economics. As this study touches on both economic and 
political aspects, I use institutional theory. 
Scott (1995) notes that institutions typically have three forms: cognitive, 
normative, and regulative. In all three forms, “institutions are transported by various 
carriers—cultures, structures, and routines—and they operate at multiple levels of 
jurisdictions” (Scott 1995, 33). Scott further describes the three pillars of institutional 




 Three Pillars of Institutions 
 
Source: Scott (2001, 53). Copyright 2001 by Sage Publications, Inc.  
According to Scott (2001), regulative elements focus on setting rules and 
sanctions, whereas normative elements fulfill an obligatory role. Cognitive elements are 
developed through shared consumption and culturally supported ideas. In alignment with 
the focus of economists such as North (1990), this study will investigate how regulative 
elements are an important trait of institutions. Regulative elements are relevant to this 
study, as some institutional theorists have suggested that the development of institutions 
in a given country is often an outgrowth of that country’s colonial experience (Acemoglu 
et. al. 2002). Additionally, the main reason for failure to generate growth is lack of 
quality in government institutions (Acemoglu et. al. 2002). 
In contrast to institutional theory, modernization theory argues that developing 
nations are in the best position for speedy economic and social development because they 
can import technology from first-world nations to stimulate their economic growth (Hall 
1992). According to the ideas contained in modernization theory, countries rich in natural 
resources can develop faster by exploiting those natural resources. Proponents of this 
theory conclude that when the transfer of knowledge is coupled with resource abundance, 
resource-rich developing countries can quickly advance to the status of industrialized 
Theory Element Regulative Normative Cognitive 
Basis of compliance Experience Social Obligation Taken for granted
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic
















nations. These supporters further argue that countries should transfer their resource 
revenues from existing activities to modern industrial activities. This transfer involves a 
shift of labor to new industrial sectors, with specific focus on a more advanced 
technological system. However, some countries have failed to achieve development even 
when following this recommendation; a result that has provoked criticism of 
modernization theory as insufficient to properly predict what will generate economic 
growth in emerging nations. 
Dependency theory originated as a critique of modernization theories. 
Dependency theory predicts that resources will flow from economically poor but 
resource-rich countries to wealthy states, thereby benefiting wealthy states at the expense 
of resource-rich but economically poor and underdeveloped countries (Tausch 2003). In 
other words, rich countries developed because others were underdeveloped. This theory 
assumes that poor states will remain poor as they try to integrate into the world system, 
and that poor nations will remain poor so that they can be suppliers of resources, cheap 
labor, the recipients of out-of-date technology, and serve as a market for rich countries. 
Dependency theory notes that this happens as a result of an unfair integration of poor 
countries into the world system. Although interesting, dependency theory fails to provide 
a path for development of emerging and developing countries. 
As dependency theory lost support, the big-push theory emerged, claiming 
resource-rich countries will benefit significantly as a result of resource booms 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1961). For example, Lewis (1955) asserts that resource abundance 
increases capital because of increased exports; increased exports, in turn, aid economic 
growth. The big-push theory is entirely based on the positive impact of resource wealth in 
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a given country. Any factors that simulate aggregate demand, whether the discovery of 
minerals or price increases in natural resources, are significant catalysts for growth and 
development. The big-push theory claims that publicly coordinated investments can 
break the cycle of poverty by helping developing economies overcome deficiencies in 
private incentives that prevent firms from adopting modern production techniques and 
achieving economic growth (Rosenstein-Rodan 1961). 
In direct opposition to the claims of the big-push theory are the ideas contained in 
resource-curse theory. Resource-curse theory suggests that as dependence on natural-
resource exports increases, economic growth (commonly measured in terms of GDP) 
declines (Sachs and Warner 1995). The theory argues that rather than fueling growth and 
development, natural-resource wealth can become the cause of economic stagnation. This 
is mainly because countries invest heavily in the resource sector, ignoring other vital 
sectors that are crucial to improve a given economy. This theory has many critics, as only 
few resource-rich countries managed to translate their natural-resource wealth to 
economic growth and development. The resource curse hypothesis and its relations with 






Figure 1. Institutions and the Natural Resource Curse Theory. 
Weak institutions and resource rents create political dysfunction(s) (2) that will have (1) 
direct and indirect impacts on low economic growth. Political dysfunctions in turn create 
macroeconomic challenges (3), which feed into weak institutions. Similarly, political 
dysfunction will also contribute to low economic growth. Source: (Jones 2008, 13). 
This study contends that a natural resource curse exists because a number of 
developing countries have failed to expand their economies. Therefore, this theory will be 
under analysis for this study, making it impossible to use the resource-curse theory as an 
explanatory factor in this study. 
Modernization, dependency, the big-push theory, and natural-resource-curse 
theory helped instill a new way of thinking about the economic development of poor 
countries. One example of this new way of thinking is the link between the natural-
resource dependence to civil war and conflict (Humphreys, Sachs, and Stieglitz 2007). 
This change gives rise to the role of institutions in overcoming the natural-resource curse, 
thereby resulting in a growing consensus on the basic relationship between resource 
dependence, economic growth, and institutions. 











After reviewing the theories discussed above, institutional theory best explains 
transparency and the main explanatory variables used in this study. Additionally, the EITI 
is rooted in the idea that transparency should be institutionalized. Increasing the quality 
of institutions in implementing EITI has become popular and has grown in the past few 




REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
One of the most influential ideas in recent development dialogue is the resource 
curse. Resource-curse theory claims that countries abundant in natural resources will 
have negative economic-development outcomes because of low economic growth and 
development, corruption, and resource-led conflicts. The natural-resource curse claims an 
inverse relationship between high revenue from abundant-resource countries and 
economic growth. Sachs and Warner (1995; 2001) first examined the correlation between 
natural resources and economic growth, and since then a vast amount of literature 
analyzed the existence of and possible mechanisms through which an abundance of 
natural resources can negatively impact economic growth. 
Sustainable development is defined as “meet[ing] the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 16). Resource-rich countries face 
the major challenge of managing the surge of resource revenues for sustainable 
development. Attaining sustainable development requires cautious investment of resource 
revenues, something needed in most SSA countries. In addition to weak institutional 
involvement in revenues, corruption in resource revenue heavily hinders growth. 
Corruption, although an internal problem, is linked to international factors, especially 
when addressing extractive international companies. These international players in 
resource-abundant countries get favorable advantage by partnering with local politicians 
who are equally guilty with international extractive companies and the elite community 
(Kabemba et al. 2008). 
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For underdeveloped, resource-rich economies, the challenge to attain growth and 
development can be divided into three categories: economic, political, and international. 
Economic growth occurs when there is an increase in goods and services over time, while 
development refers to a country’s ability to improve the quality of life of its population 
by providing them better health and education, and promoting economic policies that 
improve market conditions domestically and internationally. In contrast, political growth 
is the development of institutions, attitudes, and values that form the system of a given 
country. The following sections discuss economic, political, and international challenges 
in relation to the natural-resource curse. 
Dutch-Disease Hypothesis 
Dutch disease refers to a reduction in a country’s ability to export from non-
resource sectors as a result of an appreciation in the exchange rate due to substantial 
earnings from the export of natural resources. In other words, the Dutch disease is the 
phenomenon where the non-resource sector weakens and the country experiences 
inflation as a result of the resource flux to the thriving natural-resource sector. The first 
article introducing the phrase Dutch disease was published in The Economist in 1977 
where the etymology of the phrase is explained. The phenomenon is named after The 
Netherlands’ discovery of natural gas, which resulted in the decline of its manufacturing 
sector in 1959. This discovery led to a shift in prices in non-gas sectors and in the 
exchange rate, making previously competitive exporters lose market share and decrease 
their export (“The Dutch Disease” 1977). The rising gas exports caused The Netherlands’ 
exchange rate to appreciate against other currencies, which, in turn, resulted in wages 
increases of the natural-gas sector faster than productivity in non-gas sectors. 
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Evidence exists of similar results in countries as their real exchange rates 
appreciate; this somewhat widespread appreciation has forced the secondary sector of the 
economy to decline (Barbier 2003). The driving factor behind these exceptional situations 
is an increased emphasis on the primary resource sector of production; this emphasis 
neglects other manufacturing sectors, having a negative impact on the country’s 
economic growth (Gylfason 2001). The Dutch-disease economic model assumes the 
following: “The economy has two sectors: 1) a tradable sector, and 2) a non-tradable 
sector. Since the economy is assumed to be small in the world market, the economy faces 
fixed relative international prices for tradable goods” (Corden and Neary 1982, 2). 
Another consequence of the Dutch disease is the crowding out of human and 
social capital. Crowding out is a situation in which resource-led projects direct human 
and social capital to the resource sector at the expense of other sectors in the economy. 
The literature provides evidence of human and social capital crowding as one of the 
economic explanations of a resource curse. Crowding out can result from resource 
abundance, leading to a diversion of public funds from public-good provisions, such as 
financial support for education; in this case, public-good provision and education 
spending are crowded out. For example, natural-resource abundance may reduce public 
and private incentives to build human capital, as resource-rich nations often undervalue 
the long-term benefits of education. In SSA countries, where significant amounts of 
resources are being discovered, many workers are lured to the booming resource sector, 
neglecting their current work and sector. 
Studies by many economists, including Auty (1993), Gylfason (2001), and 
Barbier (2003), demonstrate the existence of Dutch disease in underdeveloped and 
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resource-rich countries, including many SSA countries. Similarly, Gelb (1988) focused 
on six oil-exporting countries: Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Venezuela; his research shows that the non-resource tradable sectors in 
these countries (agriculture and manufacturing) were neglected during the resource boom 
period. He also notes that some countries borrowed more money using their natural 
resource as collateral, and when oil prices fell, they faced unfavorable adjustments. 
In consequent decades, international institutions, such as the World Bank, the 
International Monitory Fund, and the United Nations Development Program, have 
stressed the importance of avoiding Dutch disease by investing in non-resource sectors to 
achieve economic growth and development in resource-abundant countries. 
Corruption and Rent Seeking 
Two major economic challenges associated with the resource curse are rent-
seeking and corruption (Auty 2001). Rent-seeking occurs when “individuals or firms 
compete for economic rents that arise when government restrictions are imposed” 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2005, 628). Corruption is defined as the abuse of public or private 
office, position, or power for private gain in contravention of established rules or norms 
(Kaufmann and Vicente 2011). Corruption diverts resources from productive activities 
and increases costs of investing, resulting in reduced economic growth; corruption has 
fueled many resource-led wars and conflicts in SSA countries. In countries where 
authoritarian governments control power, evidence substantiates that resource revenues 
are not reported, ultimately existing as a theft from the population. For example, a 2007 
study shows that “at least one in every eight barrels of oil currently entering the United 
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States has been stolen from its country of origin” and sold by local corrupt officials to 
international extractive industries (Wenar 2008, 1). 
Corruption has been established as a major obstacle for resource-rich countries in 
economic growth and development. Patronage and rent-seeking are ways corruption in 
resource-rich countries spreads (North 2005). Rent-seeking is defined as “efforts, both 
legal and illegal, to acquire access to or control over opportunities for earning rents” 
(Karl 2007, 661). Resource rents coupled with corruption affect valuable decision-
making abilities of those in power and result in low quality services with less benefit to 
the general public. At the same time, resource revenue encourages patronage as 
government officials finance their supporters to cling to their power. Auty (2001) 
suggests that the struggle for large resource rents will increase the concentration of 
economic and political power in few elites. In a potential extreme case, resource revenue 
can allow governments to favor one extractive company or individual over another in 
accessing natural resources. This can take the form of low tariffs or simply favoring one 
producer over others at the expense of public-resource revenue. The stronger the 
institutions, the less tolerance on resource rents (Ross 1999). Moreover, resource wealth 
often cripples governments with more revenue than they can effectively manage 
(Neumayer and Dietz 2005). 
Government and Transparency 
Even though economic factors have dominated the natural-resource-curse 
literature, in recent years, scholars identified political factors to be equally important in 
studying the economic progress of resource-rich countries. Governments play a key role 
in devising favorable policies for economic development. One of the interesting 
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components regarding the resource-curse outcome is the variation of governments in 
different resource-rich countries. When governments depend on mineral revenues instead 
of taxes, for example, they lack incentives to strengthen institutions required to establish 
the mechanism to provide efficient public goods and avoid conflict. 
Natural resources in SSA countries have fueled political instabilities (Karl 2007). 
Expanding on Sachs and Warner’s (1995) initial study that supported the natural-
resource-curse theory, Collier and Hoeffler (2005) found a strong negative correlation 
between resource abundance and political stability. 
Good governance is the foundation of transparency. Countries with good 
governance have a better chance of practicing transparency and experiencing low 
corruption. A study by Méon and Sekkat (2005) on the relationship of the quality of 
institutions and corruption finds that “corruption is most harmful to growth where 
governance is weak” (5). An Open Society Institute of Southern Africa (2009) study on 
resource-rich SSA countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, 
Tanzania, and Zambia found that mineral-rich countries in Africa are not benefiting 
enough from mining firms, due to poor governance. This case study further reveals that 
mining firms in many African countries gain extra advantage from excessive and 
generous tax concessions due to poor legislation motivated by corruption in the countries 
they operate. As a result of the already low concession and corruption, the government 
reports much lower resource revenue than they should have received. This revenue is 
reduced even more as corrupt politicians skew the reported funds. Additionally, good 




Moreover, in 2009, international organizations including the World Bank, 
recognized that enhancing transparency in extractive industries is critical for economic 
growth and sustainable development in Africa (World Bank and Global Witness 2008). 
Furthermore, the African Good Governance Index demonstrates a possible direct 
relationship between government type and economic development in the region. For 
instance, the 2012 index, which rates the performance of forty-eight African nations 
against a number of criteria including security, human rights, economic stability, just 
laws, free elections, corruption, infrastructure, poverty, and health, shows that the top-
ranked countries are the most economically advanced nations in the region. The current 
study aims to contribute to the literature related to transparency and good governance by 
looking at efforts to increase transparency, including the adoption of an international 
transparency initiative, ultimately to overcome the natural-resource curse and achieve 
economic growth in SSA. 
It should be noted that the top-ranked countries vary in their government type, 
suggesting no single form of government reduces or increases the potential to avoid the 
natural-resource curse and attain economic development. Government types in Africa 
range from democratic governments, like in Mauritius to autocratic governments, like in 
Zimbabwe. One party, multiparty, and military governments dominate resource-rich SSA 
countries. In SSA, democratic governance and equitable economic development are 
challenging, making crucial the need to develop a clear understanding of how to translate 
natural-resource abundance into economic development. The literature on natural 
resources and democracy is divided, however, with one group suggesting that some 
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degree of transparency and democracy is sufficient, whereas authors such as Ross (2001) 
even argue that oil abundance hampers democracy. 
One possible way some resource-rich countries are able to overcome the natural-
resource curse is by creating a resource revenue fund and distribution; Norway is a good 
example of such a system. The resource-fund system directly transfers resource revenue 
to citizens through various mechanisms. Many countries have different forms of fund-
transfer programs that distribute resource funds: in Indonesia, distribution is community-
based; in the Gulf countries, it is employment-based; in Alaska and Kuwait, resources are 
directly distributed without conditions. In other counties, distribution is direct, with 
conditions like pensions, child allowances, and negative income taxes (Gelb and 
Grasmann 2009). The applicability of this mechanism for African countries is still being 
investigated. Countries like Chad and Botswana may seem to be a good fit for this 
mechanism (United Nations 2009), but further analysis is needed to identify what kind of 
policies should be put in place to ensure successful replication. Botswana, as the least 
corrupt country in Africa, is identified as the best candidate for the potential 
establishment of revenue funds in the region. Gelb and Grasmann (2009) argue that 
resource funds can be useful but do not cure the entire resource curse. Such funds have 
the potential to inspire transparency and accountability mechanisms, as seen in Alaska 
where they built constituency, but he argues that they are not a substitute for 
transparency. 
The literature on the political challenges related to the natural-resource curse 
identifies strong institutions as key attributes for resource-led economic growth. 
Institutions, as defined by North (1990), are “the basic rules of the road in an economy, 
23 
 
including formal systems, such as constitutions, laws, taxation, insurance, and market 
regulations, as well as informal norms of behavior, such as habits, customs, and 
ideologies” (1). Economists stress the importance of existing institutions as determining 
factors for what is known as take off. Functional and effective guidelines, such as in a 
judiciary structure, are required to ensure that natural resources are managed with 
accountability. The literature stresses the importance of civil society and independent 
bodies to strengthen government institutions in extractive economies. The international 
political and economic system also plays an important role in the success of these 
economies. The following sections discuss the role of international actors in natural-
resource-rich countries. 
International Challenges 
International actors involved in extractive industries should share the blame for 
the low economic growth and development in resource-rich countries. It is not a 
coincidence that resource-rich countries that enjoy economic growth have a transparent 
payments mechanism, which leads to effective management of their resource revenues. 
Developed Countries and International Extractive Companies 
Although resource-rich countries take the primary responsibility of ensuring 
proper use of their natural resources to benefit their own citizens, developed countries 
and extractive industries play a key role in making the governments’ efforts a success. 
For instance, developed countries can help enforce the transparency of extractive 
industries. They can also advocate closing secret bank accounts housed in developed 
countries and owned by government officials of resource-rich countries. 
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Promoting good governance is another role developed countries can play to 
reduce conflict and war in resource-rich countries. In most SSA countries, revenue from 
natural resources is used to purchase arms sold by developed countries. Although 
difficult to implement, even a small effort to eliminate this cycle can effectively increase 
potential growth and development in these countries. Stiglitz (2005) argues that if 
developed countries, resource-rich countries, and extractive companies implement any of 
these changes, there is a chance that natural resources will become a blessing instead of a 
curse. 
China in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Avoiding the resource curse has become crucial as the prices of commodities 
continue to rise. Commodity experts expect this trend to continue in the coming years, 
fueled by demand for natural resources from emerging economies like China and India, 
as they continue to sustain their economic growth and development efforts. Resource-rich 
SSA countries face new pressure to implement a transparent system as they continue to 
discover new resources in the region without adequate institutions in place. More 
countries in Africa have joined leading mineral and oil exporters in recent years; 
however, demand for resources has also increased, and prices continue to rise. In the past 
few years, Ghana, Uganda, Niger, Mauritania, Tanzania, New Guinea, South Sudan, 
Mozambique, Liberia, and Kenya have discovered new sources or have completed an 
extensive exploration in order to start production. 
In SSA, a transparent system and institution has become more crucial as China 
and international extractive industries continue to expand their investment. Lack of 
transparency has allowed many actors to exploit resources in SSA countries. Emerging 
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economies, including China, have strengthened ties with SSA countries. As one of the 
world’s largest consumers, China has turned to SSA for natural resources. Given China’s 
need to sustain its economic growth, that country will need more resources in the future 
(Brautigam 2010). While the continent tends to be wary of foreign international deals due 
to colonialism, China is gaining traction in Africa by presenting itself as a partner and by 
providing soft loans. It has increasingly positioned itself to be the primary importer of 
resources without addressing the issue of transparency (Michel and Beuret 2008). The 
most visible form of support from China to Africa is infrastructural support. In return, 
China has secured drilling rights in Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and Angola. In other SSA 
countries—Chad, Gabon, Mauritania, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Ethiopia—China has signed exploration and extraction 
agreements. Additionally, China has invested in mineral extractive industries in Zambia, 
Congo, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Liberia, and Mozambique. Overall, 
China’s trade with Africa has increased from $10.6 billion in 2000 to $75.5 billion in 
2008 (Brautigam 2010). China has a longstanding record of not being transparent in its 
contractual agreements in many of the countries in which they invest. This secrecy is 
convenient for allowing politicians to misuse resource revenues for personal gain 
(Brautigam 2011). Secrecy also allows China to benefit disproportionately, as 
transparency is not its priority, and it may even support corruption. 
China’s foreign policy is characterized by noninterference in internal affairs, 
which creates a safe haven for politicians to misuse resource revenues. As long as 
African governments are corrupted governments, the real impact of China’s involvement 
will not be known. International organizations like the World Bank see China’s 
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increasing involvement in Africa as a positive development, whereas other countries, 
including the United States, view this development as having the potential for a lasting 
negative impact on the economic growth of resource-rich SSA countries. 
Existing Solutions to the Natural-Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa 
International laws and regulations play an important role, especially when good 
governance is absent. This issue is quite evident in the case of resource-rich African 
countries because they suffer from corruption and lack of transparency. While some 
countries in other parts of the world also suffer from such problems, it is more severe in 
SSA. The assumption is if these countries eliminate corruption and rent-seeking behavior, 
their economy will grow and ultimately they will experience economic growth and 
development. 
International organizations, governments, and civil society groups share 
consensus that serious measures should be taken to address the resource curse 
(Humphreys et al. 2007). At the domestic level, many countries still struggle to overcome 
corruption. At the international level, little has been done, even though close to 90% of 
the extractive companies involved in corruption are international, and are based in 
developed countries. The failure of existing legal institutions to monitor resource 
revenues for the benefit of the public has angered many Africans and others throughout 
the world. As a result, various initiatives have emerged to attempt to make these 
extractive companies and governments more accountable. The most prominent 
international and regional attempts include the EITI, Publish What You Pay, the 
Kimberley Process, the Global Sullivan Principles, and the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development guidelines on Multinational Enterprises. The literature on 
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transparency related initiatives to overcome the natural-resource curse identifies EITI as 
the most comprehensive and leading international instrument designed to reinforce 
transparency. EITI is currently being implemented in forty-six resource-rich countries in 
the world. 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
In 2003, the EITI was created to fill the gap in international law and to enforce 
transparency in extractive industries operating in resource-abundant countries. The 
initiative requires participating countries to publish all data on revenues from mining and 
oil operations. EITI is an international voluntary regulatory initiative supported by 
international organizations including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and the European Investment Bank. The EITI strives 
to improve governance through the verification and full publication of company 
payments and government revenues from oil, gas, and mining. Plans for this initiative 
include reversing the current misuse of natural-resource revenues (World Bank and 
Global Witness 2008). However, the effectiveness of the EITI has not yet been tested. 





Figure 2. Map of selected EITI and non-EITI Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Map showing countries of the study. Countries in green color are EITI countries, 
countries in red are non-EITI countries, countries colored gray are other Sub-Saharan 
countries that are not part of this study, and those in yellow represent North African 
countries. Source: www.EITI.org/countries. 
The initiative is set to monitor two kinds of transparency channels: the first 
between producing companies and the government, and the second, a government’s 
accountability to its citizens (EITI 2005). EITI is guided by the following principles: 
1. We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an 
important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to 
sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, 
can create negative economic and social impacts. 
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2. We affirm that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a 
country’s citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised 
in the interests of their national development. 
3. We recognize that the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue streams 
over many years and can be highly price dependent. 
4. We recognize that a public understanding of government revenues and 
expenditure over time could help public debate and inform choice of 
appropriate and realistic options for sustainable development. 
5. We underline the importance of transparency by governments and companies 
in the extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial 
management and accountability. 
6. We recognize that achievement of greater transparency must be set in the 
context of respect for contracts and laws. 
7. We recognize the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct 
investment that financial transparency may bring. 
8. We believe in the principle and practice of accountability by government to all 
citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure. 
9. We are committed to encouraging high standards of transparency and 
accountability in public life, government operations and in business, 
10. We believe that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure 
of payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to use. 
11. We believe that payments’ disclosure in a given country should involve all 
extractive industry companies operating in that country (EITI 2003). 
30 
 
The benefit for countries implementing the initiative is the potential improvement 
in investor confidence and the development of strong accountability, good governance, 
and political stability (EITI 2005). Countries initially used EITI to limit resource-curse 
problems, with the ultimate goal of improving governance and transparency (Kolstad and 
Wiig 2007). Fourteen countries are EITI compliant: Azerbaijan, Central African 
Republic, Ghana, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Mauritania, Mali, Mongolia, Peru, Nigeria, 
Niger, Norway, Timor-Leste, and Yemen. An additional twenty-one have achieved EITI 
Candidate status: Afghanistan, Albania, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Madagascar, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and Zambia (EITI 2012). As of August 2014, twenty SSA 
countries have joined this initiative and are in various stage of the EITI compliance 
process. 
Promoting initiatives like EITI costs very little compared to the potential benefits. 
Revenue audits encourage transparency and prevent government officials from misusing 
funds. In most SSA countries, citizens do not know how much natural-resource revenue 
is being generated, or where the money is spent. In most cases, secret bank accounts in 
foreign countries fuel corruption that undermines development. Additionally, prices of 
resources fluctuate, but it is impossible to account for resource revenues stolen by 
government officials. Auditing funds and allowing transparency may avoid this problem, 
increasing the possibility of channeling money to economic development. 
The following chapter will test this claim to understand whether EITI has 
impacted the economic growth of a resource-rich SSA country. 
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In summary, several known economic and political attributes of the natural 
resource curse include the following: 
 “Resource-rich countries tend to have strong currencies, which impedes other 
exports; 
 Because resource extraction often entails little job creation, unemployment 
arises; 
 Volatile resource prices cause growth to be unstable, aided by international 
banks that rush in when commodity prices are high and rush out in the 
downturns; and 
 Political dysfunction exacerbates the problem, as conflict over access to 
resource rents gives rise to corrupt and undemocratic governments” (Stiglitz 
2012, 1). 
The political strength and institutional quality of a given resource-rich country 
influences the quality of resource wealth investment, as undemocratic governments are 
often corrupt. According to institutional theory, which “considers the processes by which 
structures, including schemes, rules, norms, and routines, become established as 
authoritative guidelines for social behavior” (Scott 2001, 48), resource-rich countries 
must strive to develop norms of transparency and implement policies and laws that 
ensure benefits are brought to their citizens. 
In the last decade, natural resources estimated to be worth around $ 200 billion 
were discovered off the West Coast of Africa, increasing advocacy for revenue 
transparency (Gray and Terry 2003). As a result of these discoveries, many question if 
the windfalls from these resources will bring prosperity or an economic curse. The 
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answer to this question lies in the many attempts in the large body of literature in 
economics and political science to explain the natural-resource curse. In sum, it depends 
on the success of the various proposed solutions outlined above, including the EITI. To 
date, twenty SSA countries, shown in Table 2, have signed up to participate in the EITI 
initiative. 
Table 2 
Sub-Saharan African EITI Candidate and Compliant Countries by Year 
Country Year  Country Year 
Gabon 2005  Côte d’Ivoire 2010 
Cameroon 2007  Dem. Rep. Congo 2010 
Madagascar 2008  Rep. Congo 2010 
Sierra Leone 2008  Togo 2010 
Burkina Faso 2009  Guinea 2011 
Mozambique 2009  Liberia 2007, 2009 
Tanzania 2009  Ghana 2007, 2010 
Zambia 2009  Niger 2007, 2011 
Chad 2010  Nigeria 2007, 2011 
Côte d’Ivoire 2010  Central African Republic 2009, 2011 
Dem. Rep. Congo 2010  Mali 2009, 2011 
 
Source: www.EITI.org; countries in italics are included in this study. 
 
Transparency-related policies are seen as the most promising in overcoming the 
resource curse, as they allow citizens see the money coming in and going out, and keep 
all parties involved in the extraction of natural resources accountable. Using institutional 
theory to explain the importance of strong institutions to achieve economic growth and 
development, this study will test whether EITI brings the desired outcome in resource-






This study investigates potential options to overcome the resource 
curse,particularly, the role of transparency in the economic growth of SSA countries. 
Literature on the relationship between economic growth and natural resources is weak 
when linked with the impact of government transparency and international transparency 
enforcements in resource-rich countries. This study examines the relationship between 
economic growth and transparency in resource-rich SSA countries. For this purpose, it 
will measure the impact of the international EITI on the economies of selected countries. 
Research Design 
The study used an ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis and log–log 
regression analysis. These analyses provide an answer to the research questions of this 
study. 
The study seeks to answer the following questions: 
1. Does transparency affect the economic success of resource-rich SSA 
countries? 
2. Is there a difference between the economic performance of resource-rich SSA 
countries that participate in EITI and those not participating in EITI? 
Barro (1997) focuses on institutional factors that have mainly contributed to and 
are most detrimental for growth and development since 1960. He first identifies 
determinants of long-run growth using the estimation of panels of cross-country data. He 
applied regression to panel data covering about a hundred countries over the period 1965 
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to 1990 to determine factors that are required for long-term economic growth. His 
analysis focuses on institutional influences and average rates of economic growth in 
various countries. Using this method, he forecasts that poorer countries in which the 
government protects property rates, maintains free markets, and spends little on 
nonproductive consumption will catch up with richer countries. Specifically, he finds that 
more schooling, better health, lower fertility rates, less government consumption relative 
to GDP, greater adherence to uncorrupted Rule of Law, improvements in the terms of 
trade, and lower inflation are key factors to increase economic growth. 
Modifying the general framework developed by Barro (1997) on panel data for 
100 countries, this study uses a similar methodology with a focus on twenty SSA 
resource-rich countries. The study mainly adds transparency variables and a different 
time-period to Barro’s model to address the first research question of the study and 
proposes it will have a positive impact on the GDP of SSA extractive economies. 
Adding transparency variables and an EITI dummy, the growth model appears as 
follows: 
Economic Growth = f(Barro’s growth variables + transparency variables + other control 
variables + EITI dummy). 
Variables of the Study 
Dependent Variable 
Economic growth is the dependent variable in this study. The average annual real 
GDP per capita growth using GDP per capita purchasing-power parity (PPP) measures 
economic growth. GDP is the most commonly used measure of the economic output of a 
country. As an alternative dependent variable, this study will use GDP per capita PPP in 
logarithmic form (logs). Henceforth, GDP is simply used to refer to GDP per capita PPP. 
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Independent and Control Variables 
To account for likely endogeneity of the explanatory variables, lagged values are 
used as instruments. Barro (2003) explains that lagged variables may provide satisfactory 
instruments as the error term in the equation, as the per capita growth rate shows a slight 
serial correlation. Barro’s growth variables—inflation, fertility rate, government 
consumption, Rule of Law, Terms of Trade, and Political Rights—are combined with 
transparency-independent variables for this study. 
Transparency is defined as “a principle that allows those affected by 
administrative decisions, business transactions, or charitable work to know not only the 
basic facts and figures but also the mechanisms and processes” (TI 2013, 1). In this study, 
transparency refers to open procedures, communication and accountability in 
governments or extractive industries. 
Indicators of transparency, which are defined shortly, are voice and 
accountability, corruption, quality of budget, and fiscal management. Each of these is 
used as a variable of transparency in this study. Voice and accountability indicates the 
extent to which citizens can choose their government, political rights, civil liberties, and 
an independent press, measured by a rank created by World Governance Indicators. 
Corruption, defined by TI, is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain and is 
measured by the CPI published every year by TI for all countries. Supporters of the 
natural-resource curse stress that the contribution of corruption in the public sector has a 
significant impact on economic growth (Torvik 2002; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 
2006). The CPI, although not perfect, is the widely used and more established corruption 
measurement. Other corruption measurements are World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
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Indicators, TI’s Global Corruption Barometer, and Global Integrity’s Global Integrity 
Index. 
Quality of budget and fiscal management refers to a comprehensive and credible 
budget. This is linked to policy priorities that are effective financial-management systems 
designed to ensure the budget is implemented as intended in a controlled and predictable 
way. Moreover, quality budget and fiscal management relates to timely and accurate 
accounting. This variable also measures fiscal reporting, including timely reporting, audit 
of public accounts, and effective arrangements for follow up. World Bank’s Resource 
Allocation Index was used to measure the quality of budget and fiscal management in 
resource-rich SSA countries. 
The period 2003–2012 is used for all variables. To determine if there is a 
relationship between economic growth and EITI, the study adds an EITI dummy variable 
to the model, with values of zero when no EITI is present and the value of one when a 
country is participating in EITI. The selection of this period of analysis is intended 
primarily to compare economic progress before and after the adoption of EITI. A 
regression includes countries that are EITI compliant (see Table 1) and others that have 
not implemented the initiative to determine if adopting EITI has a significant effect. 
I added control variables for exchange rate, foreign direct investment, external 
debt, war and conflict, and foreign aid to the model. Exchange rate is one of the proven 
variables identified by most economists as having a direct impact on economic growth. 
Overvaluation is often cited as a major problem, resulting from poor exchange-rate 
management. Exchange rates have greater impact on commodity rich countries, as a 
commodity price boom can result in exchange-rate depreciation. External factors, 
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including foreign direct investment, foreign aid, and external debt also factor into 
possible impact on overall economic growth of a given country. Foreign direct 
investment is direct investment in a given country by an outside company or individual 
and has a greater direct impact on economic growth than domestic investment. The 
economic literature identifies foreign aid as one of the variables that has a statistically 
significant and negative impact on the economic growth of developing countries. This 
impact is more pronounced in countries with poor governance and institutions (Qayyum, 
Din, and Haider 2014). Similarly, external debt creates challenges for developing 
countries, as repayment of external debt requires countries to pay more than the actual 
debt, creating additional burden on the country’s ability to grow. Evidence also exists that 
debt servicing forces governments to invest less in social sectors (Fosu 2010). I also 
included dummy variables for war and conflict periods as the literature identifies that 
many wars and conflicts are caused by the presence of natural resources in SSA 
countries. 
Data and Sources 
Except for transparency variables and information for dummy variables, data for 
the majority of the variables are obtained from World Bank’s World Development 
Indicator’s database. This database has time-series data collected annually from 1960–
2012 for countries under study. 
The explanatory variables for transparency follow: voice and accountability 
comes from the World Government Indictors, while corruption data is retrieved from TI. 
Corruption data is available starting 1995 for all countries, however for countries 
included in this study, these data are available starting in 2000. In these data, corruption 
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is measured in a similar way across all countries; it is useful to compare countries over 
time. For the other transparency variables, quality of budget and fiscal management, the 
World Bank’s Resource Allocation index was used, available starting 2005 for most 
countries included in this study. The data for political rights is composed from Freedom 
House. 
As mentioned above, from the World Development Indicators, I collected the 
following variables: exchange rate, trade balance, foreign direct investment, external 
debt, and foreign aid. To measure conflict and war, I used the Uppsala Conflict Data 
program. The data for conflict is available from 1975 to 2012. This variable was collected 
as a dummy variable; those participating in conflict and war in a given year are coded as 
one, while those that were peaceful in a given year are coded as zero. 
Data used to create an EITI dummy is found in the EITI (2014). Of the forty-six 
countries currently participating in the EITI initiative (see Table 3), twenty are in SSA. 
Of the twenty SSA countries, four (Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Madagascar, and Sierra Leone) are suspended from implementing EITI because 
they failed to meet the requirements and another four are at the EITI candidate stage. 
Of the twenty countries in the study, ten are SSA countries that are implementing 
EITI and another ten SSA countries that do not participate in the EITI scheme (see Table 
4). EITI countries included in this study are all at the compliant stage of the EITI process. 
A candidate country is one “that has publicly committed to implement EITI and has met 
the first five EITI sign-up requirements”; a compliant country is one “that has fully met 
all the EITI requirements and has undergone a successful external validation” (Ravat and 




All EITI Countries at Various Stages of Implementation  
Intent to Implement Candidate Compliant 
Australia Afghanistan Albania 
Brazil Cameroon Azerbaijan 
Colombia Chad Burkina Faso 
France Democratic Rep. of Congo Central African Republic 
Myanmar Guatemala Cote d’Ivoire 
Ukraine Guinea Ghana 
United Kingdom Honduras Iraq 
United States Indonesia Kyrgyz Republic 
 Kazakhstan Liberia 
 Madagascar Mali 
 Sao Tome & Principe Mauritania 
 Sierra Leone Mongolia 
 Solomon Islands Mozambique 
 Tajikistan Niger 
 Philippines Nigeria 
 Trinidad and Tobago Norway 
  Peru 
  Republic of Congo 
  Tanzania 
  Timor-Leste 
  Togo 
  Yemen 
  Zambia 
 




List of Selected Resource-Rich Sub-Saharan Africa Countries (EITI and Non-EITI) 
EITI Countries Non-EITI Countries 
Burkina Faso Angola 
Ghana Botswana 
Liberia Equatorial Guinea 
Mali Gabon 
Mozambique Guinea Bissau 
Niger Namibia 
Nigeria Sao Tome and Principe 




Source: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI 2014) 
 
Because of the lack of availability of data for all variables and all years, the study 
only covers the years 2003 to 2012. Only SSA countries are included in this study. The 
study uses data from twenty SSA countries of the forty-eight countries located south of 
the Sahara. 
Data-Analysis Procedures 
In this study, twenty African countries are included with an annual data span from 
2003 to 2012. I adopted a Barro-type (1991) growth model to analyze the impact of 
transparency on economic growth. First, I changed all data of the independent variables 
to a standardized form because most data variables were not collected in the same unit. 
Second, I used a correlation test to assess the relationship between each independent 
variable and to check for high correlation. If there was no multicollinearity, the variables 
were used in the regression model. If there was multicollinearity, a parsimonious model 
was identified to develop the plausible model. Third, I conducted regression to show how 
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the difference in growth of real GDP per capita relates to the independent variables (see 
Table 5). 
Model 
GDP = β0t + β1tP + β2tFR + β3tGC + β4tRL + β5tTT + β6tPR + β7tC + β8tQB 
 + β9tVA + β10tEITI + β11tWC + β12tER + β13tFDI + β14tED + β15tFA + εt 
Table 5 
Description of Model and Data Source 
Variable Description Source 
GDP Gross domestic product measured in per capita income WDI 
P Inflation  WDI; Index Mundi 
FR Fertility rate WDI 
GC Government consumption 
WDI; Index Mundi; African Development 
Bank 
RL Rule of law WDI 
TT Terms of trade WDI 
PR Political rights Freedom House 
C Corruption Transparency International 
QB Quality of budget and fiscal management World Bank Resource Allocation Index 
VA Voice and accountability World Government Indictors 
EITI Extractive industries transparency initiative  EITI 
WC War and conflict Uppsala Conflict Data 
ER Exchange rate WDI 
FDI Foreign direct investment WDI 
ED External debt WDI; Index Mundi 
FA Foreign aid (official development assistance) WDI 
 
WDI = World Development Indicators; ADBG = African Development Bank Group. 
 
An EITI dummy variable is a binary variable that is coded to either 1 or 0 to 
gauge if EITI participation causes any change in the dependent variable. A comparison 
between EITI-sampled countries and untreated countries that have relatively similar 
characteristics can show the difference between countries implementing EITI and those 
that do not. 
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The analysis used an unbalanced panel because of the missing data for some years 
for the countries included in this study. This study claimed to find that highly corrupt 
countries grow at a slower pace than more transparent countries. Barro (1996) suggests 
that 20% corruption is good for economic growth. Most SSA countries used in this study 
are ranked at the bottom but at varying levels in the CPI 2013. 
Limitations 
One major limitation of this study is the frequency of available data. Most 
variables used in the study are available only on an annual basis, which limits 
observations by country. Another constraint is the year when data starts for most 
countries. For example, the corruption data for countries included in this study is 
available starting in 2000. I used some variables as proxies to capture the effect of the 
variable of interest. Nevertheless, given this limitation, the study is useful in addressing 
one of the missing links, understanding the role of transparency in resource-rich 
countries. 
As outlined in Chapter II, good institutions lay the foundation necessary for 
strengthening proven growth variables. The following section, finding and analysis, in 
addition to answering the research questions, will examine which government and 
institutional transparency-related variables play a key role in the economic growth of 




FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
Data Adjustment and Descriptive Statistics 
Prior to the onset of all data calculations, I took several steps to ensure the 
integrity of the data under analysis. These steps included the following: 
Missing Data 
Four variables in the dataset had missing values. These variables are GC: General 
government final consumption expenditure measured in constant 2005 $ (4 missing 
values, or 2% of the overall dataset); TT: Terms of trade (1 missing value, or 0.5% of the 
overall dataset); C: Corruption (twelve missing values, or 6% of the overall dataset); QB: 
Quality of budget and financial management (thirty-two missing values, or 16% of the 
dataset). 
Instead of doing an overall substitution of mean values for missing data on a 
given variable, each of the twenty countries in the dataset was used as the frame through 
which to substitute means for missing data on a given variable. In other words, the data 
were restricted to a given country, and then the mean values for a given variable were 
substituted for missing data for the variable in question. For example, the variable Terms 
of Trade had a missing data point for the country of Sudan for the year 2012. To 
substitute the mean for missing data in this instance, the dataset was first restricted to the 
ten data points for the country of Sudan, and then the mean of the variable Terms of 
Trade for the country of Sudan was substituted for the missing value. This method of 
mean substitution has the benefit of more accurately interpolating the correct mean to 




Two variables in the dataset (Rule of Law and External Debt) had significant 
negative values associated with their measurement metric. The presence of negative 
values, as explained in the next paragraph, is problematic for logarithmic transformation; 
then, similar variables, which had no negative values, are used in place of the two 
problematic variables. 
The variable Rule of Law, which was originally measured on a metric of −2.5 to 
+2.5, was switched with a similar measure obtained from the World Government 
Indicators website. The similar measure is the Rule of Law: Percentile Rank, which is a 
variable that indicates a given country’s rank among all countries covered by the 
aggregate indicator, with zero corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. By 
definition, this variable has no negative values, which remediated the original problem. 
The variable External Debt—which I originally measured using net flows of 
external debt that were both public and publicly guaranteed—was replaced by a similar 
measure obtained from the Index Mundi database. The similar measure is External Debt: 
total dollars in billions of dollars, which is a variable that estimates total public and 
private debt owed to nonresidents, repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. By 
definition, this variable can have no negative values, which remediated the original 
problem. 
Variables Formatted 
The variables Government Consumption and Foreign Aid were measured in 
billions of dollars. However, these two variables were captured in exact dollar amounts, 
and not in a decimal format. To align these two coefficients with the decimal format of 
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most other currency-based variables in the dataset (i.e., the decimal representing billions 
of dollars), I divided these variables by 100,000,000. This operation readjusted the 
decimal of the coefficient variables without fundamentally altering the nature of the 
variable. 
Variables Translated and Transformed 
The variables, Inflation and Exchange Rate, had data with negative and zero 
values, which are problematic to conduct logarithmic transformations. The variable 
Inflation had ten negative values and five zero values. The variable Exchange Rate had 
five zero values. Neither negative numbers nor zero values can be logarithmically 
transformed. Rather than deleting the troublesome data, I decided a constant would be 
added to each variable (i.e., the variable would be translated) and then transformed via 
the natural logarithm function. This procedure is commonly used for economic data with 
zero or negative values (Wicklin 2013). For the variable Inflation, I added a constant of 
4.0 to overcome the lowest negative value of inflation in the variable (−3.5). For the 
variable Exchange Rate, I added a constant of 1.0 to the data to overcome the lowest 
value of inflation (0.0 for Zimbabwe). Zero values were listed for inflation in Zimbabwe 
because in 2009 Zimbabwe suspended its distribution of a national currency. 
Variable Eliminated 
The variable Foreign Direct Investment was eliminated from analysis. The 
rationale for this decision was two-fold. First, a significant number of negative values 
were associated with this variable. The negative values (in one case, −6.8 billion) cannot 
be transformed into logs. Second, because Foreign Direct Investment is included solely as 
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a statistical-control variable, its deletion does not significantly impact any theoretical 
arguments made in the study. 
 
This study sought to answer the following research questions: 
1. Does transparency affect the economic success of resource-rich countries in 
SSA? 
2. Is there a difference between the economic performance of resource-rich SSA 
countries that participate in EITI and those not participating in EITI? 
To investigate these research questions, I put forward the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 
H0: There is no relationship between transparency and economic growth in 
resource-rich SSA countries. 
H1: There is a direct relationship between transparency and economic growth in 
resource-rich SSA countries. 
Hypothesis 2 
H1: There is no difference on economic growth between EITI and non-EITI 
participants. 
H1: There is a direct relationship between economic growth and EITI 
participation. 
To investigate these hypotheses, I constructed the following regression equation: 
Y = β0 + β1P + β2FR + β3GC + β4RL+ β5TT + β6PR + β7C + β8QB 
 + β9VA + β10EITI + β11WC + β12ER + β13ED + β14FA +ε, 
where 
Y = GDP measured in per capita income in current international dollars; 
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P = Inflation, consumer prices in annual percent; 
FR = Fertility rate; 
GC = General government final consumption expenditures in constant 2005 US dollars; 
RL = Rule of law, percentile rank, where agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society; 
TT = Terms of trade, or the net barter terms of trade index; 
PR = Political rights, estimated by electoral processes, political pluralism, and 
functioning of government; 
C = Corruption, which is the perceived level of public-sector corruption; 
QB = Quality of budget and financial management, or the extent to which a 
comprehensive and credible budget links to policy priorities, effective financial-
management systems, and timely and accurate accounting; 
VA = Voice and accountability, which is the extent a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as enjoy freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media; 
EITI = A dummy variable indicating EITI participation (1 = yes); 
WC = A dummy variable indicating if war and conflict are present in a country (1 = yes). 
ER = Official exchange rate in local currency units relative to the U.S. dollar; 
FDI = Foreign direct investment in US dollars; 
ED = External debt, or the total public and private debt owed to nonresidents, repayable 
in foreign currency, goods, or services; 
FA = Net official development assistance and official aid received in current US dollars; 
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Because of the possibility of violation of several assumptions of linear regression, 
I also calculated a second regression equation. The second equation is identical to the 
first in every respect except one: I transformed all continuous independent variables and 
the dependent variable via the natural logarithmic function. I did not logarithmically 
transform the two dummy variables (EITI and WC). 
Table 6 provides the means, standard deviations, and minimum and maximum 
scores for all variables used in the investigation. Errors were checked by analyzing the 
mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum scores for all 200 data points on 
all variables. Several variables in Table 6 have been scaled to represent billions of 
dollars. For example, GDP per capita has been scaled to represent PPP in billions of US 
dollars. The average score of 4,442.60 suggests that among all twenty countries in the 
sample, the average GDP per capita was $4,444.26. Government final consumption 
expenditures are, on average, $0.053 billion for all twenty countries in the sample. 
External total debt in US dollars among all twenty countries is $7.11 billion, and the 
average of the net official development assistance and official aid received by all twenty 








I measured two variables in the dataset on a percentile metric. The average score 
of 30.48% for Rule of Law suggests that among the twenty countries in the sample, Rule 
of Law is relatively low and around 20% below the midpoint of the scale. Average annual 
inflation rate for all twenty countries is 18.76%. 
Fertility rate represents “the number of children that would be born to a woman if 
she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with 
current age-specific fertility rates” (World Bank 2014a, 1). The average score of 5.06 
means thatwomen in the twenty countries in the sample give birth to approximately five 
children over the course of their childbearing years. 
Terms of trade is measured as the percentage ratio of the export unit value indexes 
to the import unit value indexes, measured relative to the base year 2000 (World Bank 
2014b). Increasing values on this variable suggests more favorable terms for the country 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 4442.6 6425.67 305.8 29742.48
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 18.76 87.41 -3.5 1096.68
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 5.06 1.27 2.41 7.66
General government final consumption expenditure (constant 2005 US$) 53.06 122.77 0.16 657.59
Rule of law, percentile rank 30.48 20.12 0.94 71.29
Terms of trade 130.23 47.53 21.28 57.62
Political rights 20.47 10.94 1 37
Corruption 2.93 1.01 1.4 6.1
Quality of budget and finanical management 3.28 3.25 1.5 5
Voice and accountability 35.44 20.1 2.35 73.08
EITI particpation (1=Yes) 0.5 0.5 0 1
War and conflict (1=Yes) 0.21 0.41 0 1
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) 967.08 3152.78 0 19068.42
Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$) 7.11 10.88 0.16 71.81
External Debt: Total Dollars US (current US$), billions of dollars 8.42 11.1 0.11 114.28
50 
 
in question. Values for this variable ranged from a low of 21.28 to a high of 257.62. The 
mean value of 130.23 suggests that, on average, most countries fell into the middle of the 
distribution for this variable. 
As noted previously, the political-rights estimates fairness in electoral processes, 
political pluralism, and the overall functioning of government. Scores for this variable 
can range from a low of 1 to a high of 40; higher scores mean greater political rights in a 
given country. The mean score of 20.47 suggests that, on average, the twenty countries in 
the sample are in the middle with respect to Political Rights. 
I geared the variable that measures corruption to tap transparency, accountability, 
and corruption in the public sector. A score of zero for a country suggest it has no 
corruption, and a score of 6 means a high level of corruption. The average score of 2.93 
suggests that the twenty countries in the sample experience a moderate level of 
corruption. 
As previously noted, the variable quality of budget and financial management 
estimates the extent to which a comprehensive and credible budget links to policy 
priorities, effective financial management systems, and timely and accurate accounting. 
A six-point scale represents this variable, where higher values indicate higher quality of 
budget. The average score of 3.28 suggests that the twenty countries in the sample are 
slightly above the midpoint of the scale. 
I designed voice and accountability to measure the extent a country’s citizens are 
able to participate in selecting their government, as well as enjoy freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. This variable was measured on a 100-point 
scale, with values ranging from a low of zero to a high of 100. Higher scores indicate 
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greater levels of freedom in a country. The average score of 35.44 for this variable 
suggests that citizens in the twenty countries in the sample have limited freedoms. 
Finally, two variables in the sample were dichotomized as a way to interpret their 
respective means as a function of the category of interest. The variable EITI participation 
was coded 1 for “yes” so that its mean could reflect the percentage of countries that are 
EITI participants. The mean of 0.50 suggests that 50% of the countries in the current 
sample are EITI participants. The second variable I dichotomized was war and conflict. 
It can be seen in Table 6 that 21% of the countries in the sample are experiencing 
some form of war and conflict. This is unsurprising given the prevalent conflict in many 
SSA countries. As I substituted missing values with adjacent years or mean values, and 
adjusted, deleted, formatted, translated, and transformed the data, they were fully 
screened and cleaned to carry out multivariate analysis. 
Table 7 provides the means and standard deviations for all variables used in the 
investigation for the ten EITI study countries. Government final consumption 
expenditures are, on average, $0.293 billion for all ten EITI countries in the sample. 
External total debt in US dollars among all ten EITI countries is $5.50 billion, and the 
average of the net official development assistance and official aid received by all ten 




Descriptive Statistics for All Variables Used in the Analyses: Ten EITI Study Countries 
 
Note: N=100 
Two variables in the dataset were measured on a percentile metric. For the Rule 
of Law, the average score of 32.56% suggests that among the ten countries in the sample, 
Rule of Law is relatively low and around 18% below the midpoint of the scale. The 
average annual inflation rate for all EITI-participating countries in the study was 7.68%. 
Countries participating in EITI have a slightly higher average Quality of budget 
and financial management than countries that do not participate in EITI. However, the 
average corruption of 2.8 was lower in EITI-participating countries, compared to 3.05 in 
non-EITI-participating countries (see Table 8). A score of zero for a country suggests it 
has no corruption, and a score of 6 means a high level of corruption. The average scores 
of 2.8 and 3.05 suggests that, on average, a moderate level of corruption exists in both 
EITI and non-EITI sample countries. Political rights, on average, are less prevalent in 
non-EITI countries (17.96); while EITI countries record a slightly better figure, 22.97. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 1119.52 484.30
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 7.68 5.84
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 5.78 .92
Rule of law, percentile rank 32.56 14.15
General government final consumption expenditure (constant 
2005 US$)
293.34 529.35
Terms of trade 124.54 45.48
Political rights 22.97 7.32
Corruption 2.80 .50
Quality of budget and finanical management 3.40 .65
Voice and accountability 38.72 12.95
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) 353.19 386.14
Net official development assistance and official aid received 
(current US$)
127.28 133.70




Descriptive Statistics for All Variables Used in the Analyses: Ten Non-EITI Study 
Countries 
 
Evaluation of OLS Regression Assumptions 
Four assumptions emerged for a valid OLS regression: linearity, 
homoscedasticity, independence of errors, and normality of errors (Allison 1999). The 
first assumption states that all relationships between each of the independent variables 
and the dependent variable must be linear in nature. 
The method through which this assumption is met is to visually examine the 
Normal P-P Plot, which is also known as the plot of the regression standardized residuals 
(Allison 1999). If a general linear trend can be seen in this plot, then the assumption of 
linearity is satisfied. As can be seen in Figure 3, a general linear trend exists in the 
Normal P-P Plot. One can therefore conclude that the first assumption of linearity is 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 7765.69 7775.10
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 29.85 122.78
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 4.33 1.15
Rule of law, percentile rank 28.39 24.58
General government final consumption expenditure (constant 
2005 US$)
767.90 1623.54
Terms of trade 135.92 49.06
Political rights 17.96 13.21
Corruption 3.05 1.33
Quality of budget and finanical management 3.17 1.10
Voice and accountability 32.15 24.95
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) 1580.98 4366.92
Net official development assistance and official aid received 
(current US$)
41.21 56.07






satisfied. However, if a general linear trend is not seen in the Normal P-P Plot, then the 
assumption is violated and corrective action is necessary. The most common corrective 
action for the violation of this assumption is to logarithmically transform the independent 
variables and the dependent variable (Anderson 2003). 
 
Figure 3. Normal P-P plot for the OLS regression results contained in Table 6. 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita, PPP (current international $). The average gross per 
capita for all countries and all explanatory variables shows a linear trend in the normal 
P-P plot. 
The second assumption of OLS regression pertains to homoscedasticity of data. 
Homoscedasticity occurs when the variance of the dependent variable is the same at all 
values of the independent variable and when there is a constant variance-of-error term 
(Hair et al. 2005). The Breusch–Pagan Test (Breusch and Pagan 1979), which is a chi-
square test of this assumption, is one of the common ways to check for the existence of 
heteroscedasticity. A statistically significant chi-square value signifies heteroscedastic 
data. In this analysis, the Breusch–Pagan test was statistically significant ( 2 = 172.40, 
df = 14, p < .001), which suggests that the data are heteroscedastic. Breusch and Pagan 




independent variables and the dependent variable be used as a means to adjust for 
heteroscedastic data. After the data are transformed into log form and the Breusch–Pagan 
test run, this assumption of homoscedasticity is not violated. 
The third assumption checks for the independence of errors in the data (Allison 
1999), also known as serial correlation. To check this assumption, the Durbin–Watson 
statistic, which is the standard test to detect autocorrelation, is calculated (Anderson, 
Sweeney and Williams 2002). The Durbin–Watson statistic is specifically designed to 
detect if the disturbance terms in an OLS regression equation are correlated or unrelated 
to each other. A Durbin–Watson statistic greater than a value of 3 or less than a value of 
1 will indicate that disturbance terms are positively correlated; values closer to 2 suggest 
no correlation of errors (Allison 1999). In the current study, the Durbin–Watson statistic 
was 0.39, which suggests correlation among disturbance terms. Thus, a logarithmic 
transformation of the independent variables and dependent variable was necessary as a 
corrective (Hair et al. 2005). 
The final of the four assumptions concerns the normality of errors. This 
assumption checks to see if the error terms in a regression model are normally 
distributed. The best check of this assumption is the Shapiro–Wilk test of the 
standardized residuals (Shapiro and Wilk 1965). A statistically significant Shapiro–Wilk 
test value suggests that the error terms in an OLS regression equation are not normally 
distributed (Shapiro and Wilk 1965; Allison 1999). In the current investigation, the 
Shapiro–Wilk test is highly significant (SW = .64, df = 200, p < .001), which suggests 
that the error terms are not normally distributed. The typical corrective action for this 
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assumption violation is a logarithmic transformation of both the independent and 
dependent variables in the regression equation (Hair et al. 2005). 
Three of the four assumptions of OLS regression were violated (homoscedasticity, 
independence of errors, and normality of errors). To correct for these issues, all of the 
continuous independent variables and the dependent variable were transformed via a 
natural logarithmic function. OLS regression results and log-log regression results are 
presented and discussed below. 
Analysis and Findings 
The results from the analysis show that the set of independent variables 
significantly predicts economic growth of resource-rich SSA countries included in this 
study. The overall regression model was statistically significant (F = 172.40, p < .001). 
The coefficient of determination, or R2 value, is 0.59, which means that 59% of the 
variation in the dependent variable is predicted by the independent variables. This R2 
value suggests a reasonable model fit (D. R. Anderson, Sweeney, and Williams 2002). 
Although not an assumption of OLS regression per se, it is generally a good idea 
to check multicollinearity. As Allison (1999) notes, multicollinearity is not a violation of 
the assumptions of regression; however, multicollinearity does make it difficult to find 
statistically significant coefficients in a regression model. Multicollinearity can make 
assessments of the strength of the independent variables and their effect unreliable. This 
is partly because a higher level of multicollinearity will cause higher standard errors. The 
high standard error in turn causes confidence intervals for coefficients to become very 
wide and makes t-statistics very small. Obviously this would affect the overall 
significance of the study, as coefficients have to be higher for a given variable to become 
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statistically significant, making it hard to reject the null hypothesis when multicollinearity 
is present. 
Multicollinearity is typically checked by calculating variance inflation factors, or 
VIFs. A VIF of 10 or greater typically indicates potential multicollinearity (Anderson et 
al. 2002). In the OLS regression, all but three VIFs are less than 7. The three VIFs that 
were higher were for the variables Rule of Law (VIF = 11.46), Political Rights (VIF = 
11.32), and Voice and Accountability (VIF = 20.14). The VIFs associated with the 
variables Rule of Law and Political Rights only just exceeded the suggested threshold of 
10. The variable Voice and Accountability had a VIF that is twice the recommended 
tolerance value. Under normal circumstances, variables with high VIFs are removed from 
the equation (D. R. Anderson, Sweeney, and Williams 2002). However, due to the 
importance of all three variables as key predictors in the OLS equation, all three variables 
are retained in the OLS regression despite the existing multicollinearity issues. 
Multicollinearity increases the standard errors of the coefficients. Increased standard 
errors, in turn, mean that some independent variables may be found to be not significant, 
whereas without multicollinearity and with lower standard errors, those same variables 
might have been found to be significant. 
The first set of hypotheses examines the relationship between economic growth 
and transparency, which is measured in corruption, quality of budget and financial 
management, and voice and accountability. I designed this hypothesis to address the first 
research question. To that end, I developed the following hypothesis: 
H01: There is no relationship between the economic growth of selected countries 
in this study and the prevalence of government corruption. 
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H11: There is a direct relationship between the economic growth of selected 
countries in this study and the prevalence of government corruption. 
H02: There is no relationship between quality of budget and financial management 
and economic growth in resource-rich SSA countries. 
H12: There is a direct relationship between quality of budget and financial 
management and economic growth in resource-rich SSA countries. 
H03: There is no relationship between voice and accountability and economic 
growth in resource-rich SSA countries. 
H13: There is a direct relationship between voice and accountability and economic 
growth in resource-rich SSA countries. 
The second set of hypotheses, below, examines the relationship between 
economic growth and EITI participation, addressing the second research question of this 
study. 
H0: There is no difference in economic growth between EITI and non-EITI 
participants. 
H1: There is a direct relationship between economic growth and EITI 
participation. 
The last hypothesis tries to capture the expectation that countries participating in 
EITI experience higher economic growth than those that do not participate in EITI. 
Table 9 presents the results of the OLS regression of GDP on the independent 
variables. Decomposition of effects shows that as general government consumption, rule 




Unstandardized Coefficients from the OLS regression of Gross Domestic Product per 
Capita on All Independent Variables for All EITI and All Non-EITI Countries 
 
When examining the first set of hypotheses to assess the relationship between 
economic growth and transparency, I found that all transparency variables were not 
statistically related to GDP. These transparency variables that are not significant, as seen 
in Table 9, are Quality of Budget and Financial Management, Corruption, and Voice and 
Variable Coefficient SE p
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) -9.221 3.62 *
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) -225.15 507.4
General government final consumption expenditure (constant 2005 US$) 14.92 4.573 ***
Rule of law, percentile rank 176.712 50.987 ***
Terms of trade 43.169 7.53 ***
Political rights -246.689 93.158 **
Corruption 1542.004 912.32
Quality of budget and financial management -1477.95 879.05
Voice and accountability -77.604 67.656
EITI participation (1=Yes) -4005.05 1039.4 ***
WC: War and conflict (1=Yes) -987.325 965.42
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) -0.076 0.124
External debt: Total dollars US (current US$, billions of dollars) -182.96 56.063 ***


















Accountability. For corruption, I failed to reject the null hypothesis, which indicates that 
economic growth is not affected by the prevalence of corruption. Voice and 
accountability was also not significant. Therefore, I failed to reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no relationship between voice and accountability and GDP in resource-rich 
SSA countries. Similarly, I failed to reject the null hypothesis for the quality of budget 
and financial management variable, as the results showed no direct relationship between 
this variable and GDP. 
Finally, EITI participation appears to be negatively related to GDP. The EITI 
hypothesis stated there would be no relationship between economic growth and EITI 
participation. As can be seen in Table 8, the exact opposite is the case: EITI participation 
results in lower GDP. However, it is possible that these statistical results are an artifact of 
the violations of three of the four assumptions of regression noted earlier. To see if the 
effects remain the same once the violated assumptions are remediated, I calculated a log-
log regression. The results of the log-log regression are discussed below. 
Table 10 presents the results of the log-log regression of the dependent variable 
on the various independent predictor variables. As can be seen in Table 10, three of the 
variables that were previously statistically insignificant (fertility rate, official exchange 
rate, and net official development assistance) are now statistically significant. Two of the 
variables that were statistically significant in Table 9 (inflation and EITI participation) 
are now statistically insignificant. The EITI result was evident for countries like Mali, as 
shown in Figure 4, where a sharp decline in GDP per capita was observed just after 
joining EITI; however, Mali has been ravaged by conflict in the past few years that would 
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make assessing the country’s economic performance and its participation in EITI 
difficult. 
Table 10 
Unstandardized Coefficients from the Natural log of Gross Domestic Product Per Capita 
on the Natural Log of All Independent Variables for All EITI and All Non-EITI Countries 
 
Variable Coefficient SE p
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) -0.054 0.04  
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) -1.328 0.271 ***
General government final consumption expenditure (constant 2005 US$) 0.38 0.035 ***
Rule of law, percentile rank 0.5 0.068 ***
Terms of trade 0.595 0.087 ***
Political rights -0.261 0.118 *
Corruption -0.121 0.282
Quality of budget and financial management -0.345 0.276
Voice and accountability -0.196 0.164
EITI participation (1=Yes) -0.237 0.134  
WC: War and conflict (1=Yes) 0.042 0.092
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) 0.066 0.019 ***
External debt: Total dollars US (current US$, billions of dollars) -0.168 0.047 ***
Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$, billions of dollars) -0.377 0.046 ***




Figure 4. Mali growth overview from 2003–2012. Mali’s growth measured by GDP per 
capita over a ten-year period. Mali joined EITI in 2009 and became an EITI complaint 
country in 2011. 
 
Among the control variables, political rights is negatively related to GDP. In other 
words, as political rights increase, GDP tends to decrease among the twenty countries in 
the study. External debt was also negatively related to GDP, such that when external debt 
rises, GDP decreases. The remaining control variables, war and conflict, official 
exchange rate, and net official development assistance and official aid are not significant. 
One of the benefits of log-log transformed variables is that they help compensate 
for the violation of the assumptions of OLS regression. A secondary benefit is that in a 
regression environment, natural logarithm transformed variables allow coefficients to be 
interpreted in terms of their elasticities. That is to say, logarithmically transformed 
variables enable a person to see how a 1% change in a predictor variable will lead to a 
specified percentage change in an outcome variable (Anderson 2003). The exact amount 
of change is represented by the coefficient for the predictor variable (Hair et al. 2005). 
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The result can be explained in terms of elasticities, where the log-transformed 
model shows a percent change in one of these independent variables, a commensurate 
one percent change will exist in a country’s GDP. Decomposition of effects in Table 10 
shows that a one-unit change in fertility rate will lead to a 1.33% decrease in GDP per 
capita. Along these same lines, a one-unit change in political rights leads to a 0.26% 
decrease in GDP per capita. Lower amounts of external debt and lower amounts of net 
official development assistance will also lead to a 0.17% and 0.38% reduction in GDP 
per capita, respectively. 
General government financial consumption, rule of law, and terms of trade are all 
positively related to GDP per capita, shown in Table 10. The result for these variables 
reflect that a one-unit increase in general government consumption will lead to a 0.38% 
increase in GDP per capita, that rule of law increases GDP by 0.50%, and that terms of 
trade increases GDP by 0.60%. Likewise, a one-unit increase in the official exchange rate 
will increase GDP per capita by 0.07%. As noted in Chapter IV, the variables rule of law, 
terms of trade, and exchange rate are all significant variables in Barro’s study, showing a 
direct impact on GDP per capita. Therefore, I expected a similar finding for these 
variables’ coefficients in this study. 
As was the case in the original result, the results of the log-log regression show no 
support for the first research question of this study, set forth to investigate the 
relationship between transparency and economic growth in resource-rich SSA countries. 
Transparency in this study was modeled on the variables voice and accountability, 
corruption, quality of budget, and fiscal management. Similar to the result shown in 
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Table 7, none of these transparency variables were statistically related to GDP per capita 
in the log-log regression models. 
However, the log-log regression did change the result for Hypothesis 2, which 
stated there would be a positive relationship between economic growth and EITI 







The twofold goals of the study were to analyze transparency, which is one of the 
common prescriptions to overcome the natural resource curse, and to study if an 
international voluntary initiative impacts the economic growth of resource-rich SSA 
countries. Although transparency is an important trait of a good institution, it is not the 
sole factor that transforms the economies of resource-rich countries and ignites economic 
development. In this study I found that transparency has no statistically discernable 
impact on the economic growth of the twenty resource-abundant SSA countries under 
study. A second research question was concerned with the potential benefit of 
participating in international initiatives, particularly the EITI, to increase economic 
growth. In other words, the study was intended partly to discern whether countries 
participating in EITI can reverse the resource curse. The findings from this analysis 
indicated that EITI does not result in increasing economic growth in resource-rich 
countries. This finding was not expected, given that the literature supports that higher 
economic growth is often associated with less corruption and transparency of 
governments and companies. In fact, researchers consistently show that government and 
companies with involvement from the general public and increased participation in civil 
society record a higher growth. Yet, the result of this study does not confirm this 
outcome. 
In the parameters of the specific period under study, 2003 to 2012, government 
corruption shows no significant relationship with economic growth. Again, this finding 
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differs from the commonly held belief that low corruption leads to economic growth. The 
outcome on corruption is in line with Barro’s (2003) study on the determinants of 
economic growth. 
The claim of the importance of transparency on economic growth is unsupported 
in economic literature. Such claims are more prevalent in noneconomic studies and none, 
to the best of my knowledge, have been able to substantiate the claim empirically. 
Although transparency could have merits, including potential increases in foreign direct 
investment through improved economic atmosphere, the simple claim that transparency is 
a cure to reverse the natural-resource curse in resource-rich countries is unsupported by 
the results of this study. 
As expected, explanatory variables fertility rate, official exchange rate, and 
official development assistance are all significant, though the direction of the impact is 
somewhat surprising for official development assistance, given the negative relationships 
found with economic growth. This result supports those who argue that foreign aid might 
do harm rather than good. However, general government financial consumption, rule of 
law, and terms of trade are all positively related to economic growth. A one-unit increase 
in general government consumption will lead to a 0.38% increase in GDP per capita, rule 
of law increases GDP by 0.50%, and terms of trade increases GDP by 0.60%. The result 
of the analysis on the rule of law and trade that increases GDP by a relatively higher 
percentage is supported by the literature. Similarly, this result was also expected, as a 
well-established rule of law is one of the bases for good institutions, and stable countries 
with good institutions have been proven to experience higher economic growth. 
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In this research, I considered institutional theory to understand the relationship 
between changes in governmental behavior, particularly adopting transparency-related 
policies and initiatives and their influence on economic outcomes. The governmental 
traits required to institutionalize transparency in selected countries of this study do not 
seem to bring the expected change that would impact economic growth and development. 
If any of the EITI countries included in this study, for example, would like to 
overcome the natural-resource curse by creating a resource-revenue fund and distribution 
program, it would be difficult to institutionalize the mechanism because of a lack of 
required transparency traits. EITI’s principle seven insists that participating countries 
experience an enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct investment, in turn 
creating an indirect positive effect on their economies. As shown in the analysis result, 
this study does not support the improvement of economies in EITI-participating 
countries. Enhancing the institutional capacity and building the foundations of good 
institutions is a very difficult and complex task. Transparency is one of the important and 
newest traits of good institutions. Similar to any of the other characteristics of good 
institutions that involve existing practices, it will take a long period before transparency 
becomes ingrained and possibly exerts the presumed effect. 
More natural resources continue to be discovered in SSA countries, building 
pressure to advocate for the best mechanism to benefit from resource revenues. In recent 
years, Ghana, Uganda, Niger, Mauritania, Tanzania, New Guinea, South Sudan, 
Mozambique, Liberia, and Kenya have discovered new resources or have completed an 
extensive exploration for minerals in order to start or boost production. In parallel, 
China’s large investment in resource-rich African countries has created greater pressure 
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for these countries to establish a mechanism that benefits the public and improves their 
economy. China is gaining traction in Africa by presenting itself as a partner and by 
providing soft loans. It has increasingly positioned itself to be the primary importer of 
resources without tackling the issue of transparency (Michel and Beuret 2008). This 
study supports those who believe that the increasing Chinese presence in both EITI and 
non-EITI countries continues regardless of a prevalent transparency. This is mainly due 
to China’s foreign policy based on noninterference in local politics and with no interest in 
making transparency a priority. This is demonstrated in the significant increase of 
China’s trade with African countries (Brautigam 2010). 
Limitations 
Limitation of data for most variables forced me to narrow the number of countries 
included in this study. Selection of countries was limited due to the availability of data 
for EITI and non-EITI-participating countries. Additionally, I eliminated a control 
variable, Foreign Direct Investment, from analysis because there are a significant number 
of negative values associated with this variable, since negative values cannot be 
transformed into logs. 
A variable used to measure corruption is dependent on the existing measurement 
mechanism. Perception can be biased. The only internationally accepted corruption 
measurement, the CPI, draws from thirteen data sources that gather information on the 
perception of businesspeople and country experts. This reliance on the opinions of a 
small group renders econometric modeling ineffective. The prediction power of the 
model would increase if non-normative indexes were developed. Critics (De Maria 2008; 
Miller 2006; Philip 2006) of this measurement suggest that the developer of this index, 
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TI, should discontinue producing this annual index due to its reliance on perception and 
thus its nonscientific nature. However, the CPI continues to be the only comprehensive 
measure widely cited with annual corruption measurement data and TI argues that 
perceptions used to develop the index are one of the most reliable ways to measure 
corruption. 
Multicollinearity among one of the key variables, voice and accountability, used 
to measure transparency, had the potential to skew the overall significance of the results, 
as this variable was retained in the model even though it has a VIF that is twice the 
recommended tolerance value. However, an analysis run with a model not including the 
voice and accountability variable did not change the overall significance of the results, 
and the direction of the relationships of all explanatory variables stayed the same. 
Multicollinearity increases the standard errors of the coefficients. Increased standard 
errors, in turn, make independent variables less significant, whereas without 
multicollinearity and with lower standard errors, those same variables might have been 
found to be significant. 
Another potential limitation of the study is that countries in this study joined EITI 
in different years, which also affects the EITI status they currently hold. Thus, each 
country has a unique experience. An additional reason for this unique experience is the 
lack of trace in government use of funds. Nevertheless, misuse of funds does not only 
happen in transactions between the extractive companies and the public sector. 
Governments of these countries often misuse revenues from natural resources through 
investments that do not benefit the general public or economic growth. Similarly, EITI 
corruption can be evident during budget allocation to various public agencies. In all these 
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cases, projects favor a specific group of people, regardless of whether the country is 
participating in EITI. As more and more countries join EITI, it might be helpful to 
expand this study for a longer period, to replicate the result. 
Conclusions 
International initiatives have been strongly advocated as strategies to help in 
managing natural resources. These initiatives often bring various stakeholders, including 
the private sector, government, and civil society to address a common problem such as 
the natural-resource curse. However, as seen in this study, the EITI did not show any 
relationship with GDP per capita. EITI did not improve the economic situations of 
countries in this study. One reason for this might be the voluntary nature of EITI, which 
makes it harder to enforce and gauge its effectiveness. Therefore, it is difficult to 
differentiate resource-rich countries implementing EITI and non-implementing countries 
by the strength of their economy. 
The result related to the comparison between EITI-participating and 
nonparticipating countries highlights the lack of evidence that an external influence can 
impose a strong mechanism that will change the role of government and civil society for 
economic growth. However, this analysis of other potential solutions to the natural-
resource curse is beyond the scope of this study. EITI, although it is useful in directing 
attention to transparency, falls short of significantly impacting economies and reversing 
the natural-resource curse. One potential explanation for this might be lack of strong local 
support and proper enforcement of the initiative. Caution should be taken for EITI not to 
become another mechanism to promote corruption under the guise of promoting 
transparency. This result opens the door for testing whether, in contrast, homegrown 
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solutions, when supported by the international community, could be a better option than a 
pure international initiative. Although having a better institutional quality is proven to be 
vital, any international initiative should be dependent on the local political culture. The 
lack of EITI impact substantiates the difficulty of understanding how institutions work, 
what specific reforms are needed, and which procedures should be followed to achieve 
them. 
Similarly, empirical results showed no support for the role of transparency to 
improve per capita GDP, thereby surmising that transparency does not positively 
influence economic growth in a country. Further, none of the transparency variables 
positively related to per capita GDP. This result is in line with Stiglitz’s (2012) view on 
transparency, which highlights that transparency has become a very powerful political 
discussion; yet more critical work could further substantiate the results of this study. 
Implications for Further Research 
This research identified a gap for future investigators on the topic, which is the 
identification of the most influential institutional quality for resource-rich SSA countries, 
considering their existing social structures. Even if the transparency variables used in this 
study did not prove to impact economic growth, future studies should consider evaluating 
other institutional qualities that may shed light on the most important institutional traits 
required to achieve economic growth in resource-rich countries. Moreover, as it is not 
clear if EITI-implementation status has a direct impact on economic performance, it will 
be interesting to determine if EITI-implementation stages have any relationship to 
economic performance. Additionally, assessing the impact of EITI status (announcing 
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interest, achieving candidacy, or achieving compliance) on non-extractive economic 
growth can be an interesting study. 
One other potential useful area for future research is the study of the relationship 
between EITI participation and poverty reduction. As many resource-rich countries in 
SSA are low-income countries with significant percentages of their populations living 
below the poverty line, it will be worthwhile to assess EITI’s relationship to reducing 
poverty. Future studies should also consider including all EITI countries in all regions to 
potentially expand the results from this study. A time-series analysis of all EITI-
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